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3.

The Sci ence of Man

Perha s the chief achievement of the Enlightenment was the
crea,t,i.on _of the~, SQ Q.;i6J.. S (( ienC~§ e. .
~ca _ ~On 0
ese
.§ciences to the problems of h'1man existence.. . The selections
which follow offer a first-hand glimpse of the type of work that
Enlightenment thinkers accomplished in the fields of psychology,
~onomics, politicaL science, and ethics.
The selections are
but fragments of tEo r ougQ. systematic analyses of the foregoing
subjects. However, our primar y inter est here is to understand
some of the important assumptions and conclusions rather than
to acquire a detailed knowledge of each of the sciences. The
ideas presented may seem oversimplified and naive to the mind
of a twentieth cen tury social scientist, but that is simply the
result of a perspective based on two centuries of further research and experimentation .
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Introduction
the :understanding that sets man above
tpe rest
e beings, an g1ves him all the advantage and dominion wn!ch fie has over them; it is c ertainly
a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to
inquire into . The u n d erst a nding, like the eye, whilst it
makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice
of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a
distance and make it its own object.
But whatever be the
difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever
it be that keeps u s so mu ch in the dark to ourselves; sure
I am that all t h e li g ht we can let in upon our minds, all
the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings,
will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thou ghts in the search of other
things.
2 . This, the r efor e, being my purpose -- to inquire
into the original, cer tainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the g r ounds and degrees of beTief,
op1nion, and assent; -- I shall not at p resent meddle with
the physical considera tion o f the mind; or trouble myself
' to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come
to have any sensation by our or g ans, or any ideas in our
understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not.
These
are speculations which , however curious and entertaining,
I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the desi g n I
am now upon .
I t shall suffice to my present purpose, to
consider the disce r ning faculties of a man..., as they are
effiP!oyed about tfie objects which they have to do with.
And I shall imagine 1 have not wholly misemployed myself
in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this
histo:.r ic.al, plain me t hod, I can give any account of the
ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of thin gs we have ; and can set down any measures of
the certainty of our knowledge; or t .h e grounds of those
persuasions which a.re to be found amongst men, so various,
different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted
somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence,
that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind,
observe their opposition, and at the same time consider
the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the
resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained,
may perhaps have reason to suspect, that gither the~s
no such thing as truth at all, !2F that mankind ha~h no
~uf f~~~~t means ~ o at t a1n
nowl~d e o
1 .
3.
It is there ore worth while to searc out the
bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what
measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge,
we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persuasion .
In o r de r whereu nto I shall pursue this following
method : -First , I shall inquire into the original of those ideas,
notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which
l ,
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a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his
mind ; and the ways whe r eby the u nders t anding comes to be
furnished with them .
Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the
understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent o f it .
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and
grounds of faith o r opinion ~ whereby I mean that assent
whjch we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth
yet we have no certain knowledge . And here we shall have
occasion to examine the r easons and degrees of assent ....
Book I
Chapter I
po Innate Speculative Principles
1.
It is an establ i s h e d op1n1on amongst some men, that
there are in the understanding certain innate principles;
some primary notions, ,.. , characters 9 as it were stamped
upon the mind of man ; which the sou l receives in its very
first being, and brings i nto t he world with it.
It would
be sufficient to convince u nprejudiced readers of the ~ ;~~~
~
falseness of this supposition , if I should only show (as~~
I hope I shall in the follo. w. ing~pa.rts of th1.· s ni sc our se) ~
.
~~~
pow men, barely by the us e of their natural fac~lti ~ s 1 may ~~~at@.il1 to _ .
.
knowled e :Jill..~•.!l~y e ... ~... tp.~ help _ of ~ ,ilnY innate impressions;
nd rna arrive at ce_r:t ·
:i.:t.h~Pt a
such prigina.l notions gr _ rinciples.
For I imagine
any one will e~s1 y grant that it woul
e impertinent to
suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom
God hath given s ight, and a power to receive them by the
eyes from external objects : and no less unreasonable would
it be to attribute seve r al truths to the impressions of
nature , and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the
mind .., , ... , , ,
Book I l
Chapter I
pi Ideas in Gener aL and Their Ori _i
1. Every man being conscious to himself that he
thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst
thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt
t ,ha }; .men.Jl,a.vo i:R tbe;;t r,=minds ~Sl~~l:iil.l... ideas, -- such as are
those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness,
thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and
others : it is in the first place then to be inquired, How
he comes by them?
I know Tils a :rece :Lv.e.d ..doctrj ne, thai me.n halz.e _ ti '[e
ideas, and oricrinal c h
_ters s ~amp ed upo th~~
in their - very f k rst being/
This opinion I have at large
ex amine~ alre a dy; ana, ! - s u ppose what I have said in the
foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I
have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas
it has ; and by what ways and d egrees they may come into
the mind; -- for which I shall app eal to every one's own
observation and expe r ience .

?1!~~--4~ /_;~~~-
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2.
Let us then suppose the mind to be,, as we say, ~~
white paper , vo1 d o f a ll characters, without any ideas:-- ~~
S ow comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that ~
~
vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has _ ~~~
painted on it with an almost endless variety? ~hence hA~ ~ 
;lL.a.l .L t.he.. m@~ s
....r.eas__.o.n.....an d.-kno:w-ledge?--..;Lo .
1§ I J... .~, 0 //~~
a swer in one wo d from EXPERIEN E.
In that all our ~~~
knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derive ~ ~itself . Our observation employed either, about external
~
sensible objects, or about the internal operations of ou ~ u~~
minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that ~ 'which supplies ou r understandings with all the material~ ~~~
of thinking . These two are the fountains of knowledge, ~ , 
from whence all the ideas we have, o r can natu rally have, ~ ~- .
do spring .
~~ ~
3. Fi r st, ou r Senses, conver sant abou t particular
sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct
perceptions of things, according to those various ways
wherein those objects do affect them . And thus we come by
those ideas we have of yellow , white, heat , cold, soft,
hard, bitter, sweet, and all those whicn-we
sensible
quali t1es; which when I say the ,aenses copvey . i nta mth~
mind J I mean, they from external objects convey into the
fu ind what produces there those perceptions . This great
source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon
our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I
call SENSATION.
4 . Secondly, the other fountain from which experience
furnisheth the understanding with ideas is, -- the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as
it is employed about the ideas it has got; -- which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider,
do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas~
which could not be had from things without . And such are
perception, thinking , doubting, believing, r easoning,
knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own
minds; -- which we being conscious of, and observing in
ourselves, do f r om these receive into our understandings
as - distinct ideas as we do from bodies .affecting our
senses . This sou rce of ideas every man has wholly in
himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing
to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and
might properly enough be called internal sense . But as I
call the other Sensation, so I call this Reflection, t ~
i ~eas it a• fords ~ein~ e~~~ q pl y %~ the mind gets by re~
fleeting on its olin oi2eriiiJ:ms wit i n itself.. By reflect i on then, in the following part of this discourse, I
would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind
takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by
reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations
in the understanding. These two, I say, viz . external
material things, as the objects of SENSATION , and the
operations of our own minds within, as the objects of
REFLECTION , are to me the only ori g inals from whence all
our ideas take their beginnings . The term operations
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here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely
the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of
passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.
5. The understanding seems to me not to have the least
glimmering of
ideas which it doth not receive from one
of these two.
External objects furnish the mind with the
ideas of sensi e qua 1ties, which are all those different
perceptions they produce in us; and the mind ~urnishes the
understanding with ideas of its own operat1on ~
These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and
eir several modes, (combinations, and relations ~ ) we
all find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; andat we have nothing in our minds which did not come in
one of these two ways.
Let any one examine his own
thoughts; and thoroug hly search into his understanding;
and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas
he has there, are any other than of the objects of his
senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as
objects of his reflection.
And how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon
taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his
mind but what one of these two have imprinted; -- though
perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by
the understanding , as we shall see hereafter ....
Chapter II
Of Simple Ideas
1. The better to understand the nature, manner, and
extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that
some of them . are simple and some complex.
Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the
things themselvesr so united and blended, that there is no
separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the
ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple
and unmixed.
For, though the sight and touch often take
in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas;
-- as a man sees at once motion and colour; the hand feels
softness and warmth in the same piece of w~x:
yet the
simple ideas thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses.
The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of
ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and
whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell
of a rose.
And there is nothing can be plainer to a man
than the clear and distinct perception he has of those
simple ideas; which, peing each in itself uncompounded,
contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable intodifferent iaea~ ---2. These simple !deas, the materials of all our know+edge, are suggested and furnished to the mind ·only by
these two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these
simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare,
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and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so
can make at pleasure new complex ideas.
But it is not in
the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or
frame one new simple idea in the mind, ~ot taken in by the
ways before mentioned:
nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there.
The dominion of man, in
this little world of his own understanding being muchwhat
the same as it is in the great world of visible things;
wherein his power, however manag ed by art and skill, reaches
no farther than to compound and divide the materials that
are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making
of the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom
of what is already in being ....
Chapter XII
Of Complex Ideas
1 . We have hitherto considered those ideas, in the
reception whereof the mind is only passive, which are those
simple ones received from sensation and reflection before
mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor
have any idea which does not wholly consist of them.
But
as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its
simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby
out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations
of the rest, the others are framed.
The acts of the mind,
erein it exerts its power over its _~
chiefly t ese three~
_c.om: · ·
_ Y.
s
· to one com ound _ e · and thus all complex ideas are made.
(2) The second is Eringing two ide ~ , whether s1mple or
complex, ! o g ether, and se tt ing them by one anotherJ ~as
to take a view of ffiem at once, without uniting them into
one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations.
(3) The third is separating them from al~other ideas t at
accompany them in their real exf stence:
this is called
a s rac fl on :
an thus all its general ideas are made.
This shows man's power, and its ways of operation, to be
much the same in the material and intellectual world.
For
the materials in both being such as he has no power over,
either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either
to unite ...!hem to flether, or i:O:se f :th~m by Q:pe another. :or
wholly s~~ rate them.
I shall here begin with the first
Ol -fnese in the consi deration of complex ideas, and come
to the other two in their due places.
As simple ideas
are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of
them united together as one idea; and that not only as
they are united in external objects, but as itself has
joined them to g ether.
Ideas thus made up of several
simple ones put together, I call complex; -- such as are
beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which,
though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex
ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind
pleases, considered each by itself, as one entire thing,
and si g nified by one name.
2.
In this faculty of repeatin g and joining together
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its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what
sensation or reflection furnished it with : but all this
still confined to those simple ideas which it received from
those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of
all its compositions . For simple ideas are all from things
themselves, and of these the mind can have no more, nor
other than what are suggested to i~ It can have no other
ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without by
the senses; nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a
thinking substance, than what it finds in itself. But when
it has once got these simple ideas, it is not confined
barely to observation, and what offers itself from without;
it can, by its own power, put together those ideas it has,
and make new complex ones, which it never received so
united .
3 . Complex ideas , however, compounded and decompounded,
thou gh the1 r number be infinite, and the varie~y endless,
wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet
I think they may be all reduced under these three heads:-1.
MODES .
2 . ' SUBSTANCES .
3 . RELATIONS.
4 . First, Modes I call such complex ideas which, however compounded, con~ain not in them the supposition of
subsisting by themselves, but ~re considered as depend~nces on, or affections of §ubstances; -- such as are the
ideas signified by the words triangle, gr:JttLtuge, murder,
&c . And if in this I use the w ord mode in somewhat a different sense f r om its ordinary signification, I beg pardon;
it being unavoidable in discourses, di;ffering from the
ordinar y r eceived notions, either to make new words, or to
use old words in somewhat a new signification; the later
whereof, in our present case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two .
5 . Of these modes, there are two sorts which deserve
distinct cous i de r afian : -~rst, there are some which are only variations, or_
different co inations
t e same s1m e 1.
without
the mixture of any other; -- as a dozen, or score; whic
are nothing but t e 1 eas of so many distinct units added
together, and these I call simple modes as being contained
within the bounds of one simple idea .
~condly, there are atbers compounded of simple idea~
of several k1nds
ut to ther o make n com lex one; -v . g. beaut
consistin of a cert i
com osition of colour
and fi re ca
_
~~ theft
wh~c
eing the conce ~
of the possession of an thing,
w1 o
th
ropr1e or, conta1ns
is
visible, a combin
on of severa 1 eas of several kinds:
an
ese I call mixed modes .
6 . Secondly, the ideas of substances · · a~e ·such:· coihbi·;,;:
nations of sim
a a e taken to re resent dis t1nct
particular things subsisting by themse ves· in w ich the
supposed o~ ~fuse 1 ea o su stance, such as it is, is
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always the firs t and chief.
the simple idea of a certain dull
i
w
be,_i,cie,a_o.L J e ad.~ and
ideas of a certain sort of fi re
tion, _tllaugh:
d reasoni,n,
.),Q.j,.n
O._.§,.U stance _m~ke ~e
··· ordinary idea of. a man . Now of substances also, there a re
fWo sorts of ideas : -- one of sing le substances, as they
exist separately, as of a man or a sheep; the other of
several of those put together, as an army of men, or flock
of sheep -- which collective ideas of several substances
thus put to g ether are as much each of them one sing le idea
as that of a man or an unit.
7 . Thirdly, tne last sort of complex ideas is that we
call relat1o~*' which consists in the consideration and
comQar1n aru 'dea with another.
---- Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order.
8 . I f we t race the pro gress of our minds, and with
attent i on observe how it repeats, adds tog ether, and
uni t es its s i mp le ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us further than at first perhaps we
- should have imagined. And, I believe, we shall find , if
we warily observe the ori g inals of our notions, that even
the most abs t ruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem
from sense, or from any operations of our own minds, are
yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by
rep eating and joining together ideas that it had either
from objects of sense, or from its own operations about
them : so that those even large and abstract ideas are d .e rived from sensation or reflection, being no other than
what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties,
employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or
from the op erations it observes in itself about them, may,
and does, attain unto .
This I shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of
space, time, and infinity, and some few others that seem
the most remote, from those ori g inals.

(

*

The e£qnomic x peory first developed during the Enli ghtenment and expanded in the nineteenth century is known _ a~ clasical ec omic liber alism . The French name for the same theory
was physiocracy . Both terms convey its spirit : {reedom for
=-=-- G=ne=g
economic laws believed to be as eternal
i utable as the laws of h sics. The function o
as a science
he d to be the discovery of the laws
plain and
the actions of men 1n fie1r econom1c
----------~---

It remained for
of moral philosophy ,
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Introduction and Plan of the Work
The annual labour of every nation is the fund which
originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which
consist always either in the immediate produce of that
labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from
other nations.
Accordin therefore as this
e or what
rchased w1t 1t bears a greater or smaller proportion to
the number of those w 0 a re
wrrr--be better or worse su lied ith a
the necessaries
an conven1ences or which it has occasion .
But this proportion must in every nation be regulated
by two different circumstances : first, by the skill,
dexterity, and judgment with which its labour is_ g,e.nerally applied; and, second!
by the proportion between
e num er ojl_those w o are e~ploye 1n use u
an
a of those who are not so emplo ed. Whatever be
tlie soil, c 1mate, o ~ extent o t err 1tory of any particular nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual
supply must; in that particular situation, depend upon
those two circumstances.
The abundance or scantiness o
is su
to
depen more u on the former of those two cir
stances
~ ~~
an u Q the la e~. Among t e S~JLe natidns of hunters r?~?~
ana fishers, every individual who-rs-able to ork _is
. e
or ~s
~1~e
~ U~~£ul
a OUT, and endeavours to provide, as well as he can, the necessaries and conveniences
of life, for himself, or such of his family or tribe as
are either too old, or too young, or too infirm to go a
hunting and fishing.
Such nations, however, are s
·serably poor, that frqm mere wan , t e y are freguentl reBllced, OF:at least think themsel ves reduced, to th~-

~~ - [1)/;_~~~io~ ·

·~

~ ~~~~~~
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necessity s metimes of direct
and s
s
1?~3- a nsi.QJJ ing tbei.r .infants, the ir.......Ql d .peo~Jn d t ~....@ e
afflicted with lin e in diseases, to perish with hunger
;or - o_j:)e devour d b~ wj ,- d heaat.s.. Ail1ong(!i vi ised ana
-~ in g nations, on the contrary, though a great number
of people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the
produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times more
labour than the greater part of those who work; yet the
p roduce of the whole labour of the society is so g reat,
that all are often abundantly supplied, and a workman,
even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is fru g al and
industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries
and conveniences of life than it is possible for any
savage to acquire.
Book I
Chapter II
Of the Principle which Gives
Occasion to the Division of Labour
':this di_yi _sio
labour, from which so many advantages
are der i ved, is not ori g inal! the effe ~ t p f an human
wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence
ow 1ch it gives occasion.
It is the necess y, though
very slow and g radual _conse uence. 9!. a s,~ n p ropensily_
in human nature which has in view
ensiv
'1- ·
tne propens i y to truck, bar..t e };,. and e,.ft._c.han.g.e . p ne
tn 11'i g fo r ano eher. <::::::::==
~
Wnet h er t his propensity be one of those original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be
given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech,
it belongs not to our present subject to inquire.
It is
common to all men, and to be found in no other race of
animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other
species of contracts . Two greyhounds, in running down
the same hare, b'a ve sometimes the appearance of acting in
some sort of concert . Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion
turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence
of the'i r passions in the same object at that particular
time . Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate
exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody
ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries
sig1
nify to another, This is mine, that yours; I am wi lling to
give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal, it has no other
means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose
service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a
spaniel endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the
attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to

----
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be fed by him . Man sometimes uses the same arts with his
brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them
to act accordin g to his inclinations, endeavours by every
servile and fawning attention ~ to obtain their good-will.
He has not time, however, .t o do this upon every occasion.
In ·tvrn., ze society he stand
all ·u me, .· i n
eed- o. :the
co..:: o - - a an as~n.st a..n...c.e
ea~ m.ul tJ.tud~ , w.bile
is
whole life is scarce suffi._ci .t~,.t :tQ g.a · n tbe friendshiP. o.f
a few _ersons . . n almost every other race of animals each
n ividual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely
independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the
assistance of no other living creatur-e . But man has al~ · -·
most constant occasion for the help of hi S: brethren. and
it i s in vain for him to ex ect it from their benevolence
only . He will e more likel to r ·
if he can interest
Tne! r
- ave in his f
, and•show them that it is
eir own advantage to do for him what he requires of
them . Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind,
p r oposes to do this . Give me that which I want, and you
shall have t his which you want, is the meaning of every
such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from
one anot her the far greater part of those good offices
which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence
of the butcher, the brewer or the baker · hat we ex ect
o~r dinner,
u
rom
eir regard to their own interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities
bu t of their advantages . Nobody but a beggar chooses to
depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.
Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely . The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the
wnole fund of his subsistence. But thou gh this principle
ultimately provides him wit~ all the necessaries of life
which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide
him with them as he has occasion for them . The greater ·;
par t of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and
by pur chase . With the money which one man gives him he
pu rchases food . The old clothes which another bestows
upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which -suit
him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money,
with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging,
as he has occasion .
~s it is by treaty, by barter. and by purchase,
ob t a1n f rom one
other the ~ater . ar of those
1s same trucki·n g _dis osition
ori inally gives
occasion to
1visio
f
r. In a tri e o -hunters
~
ep e r s a particular person makes bows and arrows,
for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any
other . He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for
venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he
can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he
himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard ,
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to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and
arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a
sort of armourer.
Another excels in making the frames
and covers of their little huts or moveable houses.
He
is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours,
who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with
venison, till at last he finds it in his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become
a sort of house-carpenter.
In the same manner a third
becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser
of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of
savages. And thus the ~~t ai nty o_f being . abJ&:to _e xchau,e;e//- _/ --~
all that surplus art of the reduce
__ is ~n i ah~ur, ~~
1c 1s
r an a ove his own consumption. for such ~ z;(p~
parts of the produce of other men's labour as he may have~~~
occasion for, encourages elle cy....Jilan t o appl y himself to A -,..- - /
,
2articular occupatio~ , and to cultivate and bring to per- ~~~
fec t ion whate~ta! ent or genius he may possess for t~~- ~~
particular species of business.
~w~~-. /
The difference of natural talents in differ.e n t men l-s'(-- ___ ./~
in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the v ~y
~
differ nt genius which appears to distin~ish
of dif-~~~
feren :Lpr.o:f-e.s_sions.., when ~Ji,...._up,__
a.tuz~.i~t-y;
·
oJ; u 011dy-~~
m~n_y occasiqns s .o_ .muc_h :the..--caus as.....;t..h! e,ffect of the k/--~~
aivision of labou~.
The difference between the most dis
· ~~
s1mi"I
ara.c.t.~s, between a philosopher and -a common ~ n~iii'Pt-...,
street porter, for example, seems o arise not so ~~u~·g
cEh~~~~~~~~
. rom nature as from habit c
om and ed
i
en ~ ~ ,
they came into the world, and for the first six or eight
·· · /
years of their existence, they were very much alike, and
neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any
remarkable difference.
About that age, or soon after, they
come to be employed in very different occupations.
The
difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of,
and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the
philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance.
But without the disposition to truck, barter, and
exchange, every man must have procured to himself every
necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted.
All
must have had the same duties to perform, and the same
work to do, and there could have been no such difference
of employment as could alone give occasion to any great
difference of talents.
As it is this disposition which forms that difference
of talents, so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that
difference useful.
Many tribes of animals, acknowledged
to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much
more remarkable distinction of genius, than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place
among men.
By nature a philosopher is not in genius and
disposition half so different from a street porter, as a
mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel,
or this last from a shepherd's dog.
Those different
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tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species,
are of scarce any use to one another . The strength of the
mastiff is not, .in the least, supported either by the
swiftness of the greyhoUnd, or by the sagacity of the
spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd 1 s dog . The
effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want
of the power o r disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the
least contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the spec~es . Each animal is still obliged to
support and defend itself, separ ately and independently,
and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of
talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows .
Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses
are of use to one another; the different produces of their
respective talents, by the general disposition to truck,
barter , and exchange, being b r ought , as it were, into a
common stock, where every man may purchase whateve r part
of the p r odu ce of other men i s talents he has occasion for.
Book IV
Chapter II
st
on the Im ortat ion
f r om Foreign Countries of
Goods ·. s .-Ca
orne
. . . The -·general indu stry of the society never can exceed
what the capital of the society can employ . As the number
of workmen that can be kept in employment by any particular person mu st bear a certain proportion to his capital,
so the numbe r of those that can be continu ally employed by
all the members of a great society, must bear a certain
p r opor tion to the whole capital of that society, and never
c an exceed that proportion . ~o regulation of comm_erce can
increase th
u antit
· dus
1n an socie
be o
~
It can only divert a part
w a its ca ital c
of it into a direction into which it might not otherwise
have gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the
society than that into which it would have gone of its own
accor d .
'
Every individu al is continually exerting himself to
_find out the most advantageous employement for whatever capital
he can demand .
It is hi$ own advantage , indeed, and not
that of th
w ich
y
of his own

can
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consum tion to the carr i
trade .
In the home trade his
capital is never so long out of his sjght as it frequently
is in the for eign trade of consumption . He can know better the charac t er and situation of the persons whom he
trusts, and, if he should happen to be deceived, he knows
better the laws of the country from which he must seek
redress .
In the car rying trade , the capital of the merchants is, as it were, divided between two foreign countries, and no part of it is ever necess a rily brought home,
or placed unde r his own immediate view and command . .. .
Secondly, every individual who employes his capital in
the s u pport of domestic industry, necessarily endeavours
so to direct that industry, that its produce may be of
the greates t possible value .
The p r odu ce of industry is what it adds to the subject
or materials upon which it is employed .
In proportion as
the value of t h is produce is great o r small, so will likewise be t h e p r ofits of the employer . But it is only for
the sake of p r ofit that any man employs a capital in the
s u pport o f i n du st r y; and he will always, therefore, end~avour to employ it in the support of that industry of
which the p r oduce is likely to be of the greatest value,
or to exchang e for the greatest quantity either of money
or of othe r goods .
But the annual revenue of every society is always
precisely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or~ather is precisely the
same thing with that exchangeable value . As every individual, therefor e, endeavours as much as he c~n both to
employ his capital in the support of domestic industry,
and so to di r ect that industry that its produce may be of
the greatest value, every individual necessarily labours
to r ender the annual revenue of the society as great as
he can . He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote
the p u blic interest, nor knows how " much he is promoting
it .
p r e f err in the y,pp._ar...t,...Q,f-..dem.eS<t«i
a.t...-.-.._
forei · n 1ndu str
he intends onl his own securit; and
by 1recting that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his
own gain , and he is in this, as in many other cases, led
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
of his intention . Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it . By pursuing his own
interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
I have never known much good done by those who affected
to trade for the public good .
It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words
need be employed in dissuading them from it .
What is the species of domestic industry which his ~ 
cap i tal can employ, and of which the produce is likely to
be of the greatest value, every individual, ·
· evident ,/-/ 1 ~
can, i g his local situation, _j u d ge much better than any c:zr~-~ ~~
Stalesman o r lawgiver can do for him . The statesman, wh~ ~ 
s ou
attempt o direct priva e people in what manner
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they oug ht to employ their capitals, would not only load
himself with a most unnecessary attent ion, but assume an
au t hority which could safely be trusted, not only to no
sing le person, but to no council or senate whatever, and
which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a
man who had folly and presumption enoug h to fancy himself
fit to exercise it .
To g ive the mon
of domestic industry, in
ture, 1 ~ 1n some me asure to djrect ~r i v ate
manner the ou_
to em l _o
·
~lmos t all case
b
- e-lass"""""~:.Boo..a.....w~.Y;,,h..
lation .
If the produce of domest i c can be brought there
as clieap as that of f orei g n industry, the regulation is
evidently useless .
If it cannot, it must generally be
hurtful . It is the maxim of every prudent master of a
family , never to attempt to make at home what it will
cost him mor e to make than to buy . The tailor does not
attemp t to make his own shoes, bu t buys them of the shoemake r . The shoemaker does not attemp t to make his own
clothes, but employs a tailor.
The farmer attempts to
make neither the one nor the other, but employs those
different artificers . All of them f i nd it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which
they have some advantage over their nei g hbours, and to
p urchase with a part of its produce, or, what is the same
thing, wi t h the price of a part of it, whatever else they
have occasion for .
What is prudence in
ily, can scarce be folly

~~~_...U..:::W!IIl!"=""'..;..w.-w.~~~~s
~
om
w.
ei.-if!~d~y~a
;~:;n
l!Jro
t-~
a,.i!
- ~
-e .

e general industry of the country, being always in proportion to the
capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished,
no more than that of · the above-mentioned artificers, but
only left to find out the way in which it can be employed
with the greatest advantag e.
It is certainly not employed
to the g reatest advantage, when it is t hus directed towards
an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make.
The
value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished, when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value tharr the commodity which
it is directed to produce . According to the supposition,
that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries
cheaper than it can be made at home .
It could, therefore,
have been pur chased with a part only of the commodities,
or, what is the same thing, with a par t only of the price
of the commodities, which the industry employed by an
equal capital would have produced at home, had it been
left to follow its natural course . The industry of the
country, the r efor e, is thus turned away from a more to a
less advantageous employment, and the exchangeable value
of its annual produce, instead of being increased,
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acc o rdin g to the intenti on o f the lawgiver , must necessar ily be diminished by eve r y s u ch r e g ulati on "
By means of such r egu lations, indeed, a part icular
manufactur e may sometimes be acqu i red sooner than it
c ould have been o therwise, a nd after a certain time may
be made at home as cheap o r c he aper than in the foreign
countr y , B-u t th ou gh the industry o f the s ociety may be
thus carr ied with advantage into a particular channel
soone r than it cou ld have been o t her wise, i t will by no
means foll ow that t he s u m t otal , eithe r of its industry
o r of its r evenue s can ever be augmented by a ny such
re g·ulation , The inda str y o f the society can augment only
in p r oportion a s its capital augments, and its capital
can augment only in p r opor ti on to wh at c an be gradually
saved ou t of i ts re venu e . But the immediate effect of
every s uch r e gu lation is to d iminish its rev enu e, and
what d imi n ishe s its r evenu e is c ertainly not very likely
to a u gme n t i t s capit a l f a ster than it W0\1 ld have augmented of i t s own accor d j had both capital a n d industry
been l eft t o find out thei r natural employments .; , . .
The r e seem, howeve r , to be two cases
which it will
gene ral ly be adv a ntageou s t o la
omes J.c J.n us r
1
lar sor t of industry is
e ence o f the coun · ry , The de ence o
r eat Britain, for example, depe n s very much u pon the
numb er of its sailor s and shipping . The Act of Navigati o n 1 ther e f or e ~ ver y p r oper ly endeav our~ t o give {he ·
~ailo ~ s and the shi
i
·
"
the r ade o
eir own c ou ntr y, in some cases by absolute
.Pr'OhJ. b J. t J. o ns 5 and in others by heavy bur dens upon the
shippi n g of f o r eig n c ount r ies . , , .
The ~e c ond case , in which it will gener ally be advana e01us to
- ow
rno f o re :i n f o r the encouragement of dome st i c indu str ·, is w en s ome tax J.S J.mp os e dat - h pme. np on t he . oroJiu,pe of tg'!t latter .
n this
case j .it seems r e a Rap a ble that an e qu al tax should be imposed u . .h
i ke
. u ce o f t he fo r mer.
This would
o t give the mono p ol y o f t he home mark~ t t o d omestic
1 -r;H"11!J St cy , no r tur n t owa r ds a p ar ti cular empl oyment a
g r eate r shar e o f the stoc k and labour o f the c ountry than
what wou ld natu r a lly go t o it .
I t wou ld only hinder any
p art o f what wou ld naturally go to it fr om b eing turned
a way by the t ax int o a l ess natura l direction, and would
l e ave the c ompetition between for ei gn and domesti c indu stry, afte r the tax ~ as n e arly as possible upon the
same f oo ting as 'befor e it . In Great Britain, when any
s u ch tax is laid u pon the produ ce of domestic industry,
it i s u s u al a t the same time ~ i n o r de r t o stop the clamo r ou s c omplai n t s of ou r mer chants a n d manufacturers, that
they will be u n d e r s old a t home , t o lay a much heavier
duty u pon the import a ti on of all f o reign g oods of the
same kind .
Adam Smith, An Inqu i r y into t he Natur e and Causes of the Wealth
of Nat i o s ( Oxford ~
At tne-clarendon P r ess , 1869 ) , I: T=2, 14-18;
TI, 25-26 , 28-30, 35-36 , 38 ,
' --.A• ~ _,,;_ //~~n.d~~}
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£~ li~~e~ ~ sc~c ~ in t he eighteenth century displayed four
main t endenAie§ .
there was the notion of a _scientific ~
~
and enli gh te n ed despo 1 ~, which was popu lar in muCh of Europe ~~
trntil the French Revo l ution . The idea of an abs olut e ru
who~~
sincer e! pel ieve ,_in-~ the~ir.d.ell l s.....,Q the En lgpteniR.ent and w_Eo ~
~u l d effici~~~ rati onal and just government appealed to men who wer e conf r onted wi t h illitera te populations ~
~
on the one hand a n d with ou tmoded, chaotic laws and institutions4 ~~
on the othe r . Seco n
t h ere was the theory qf cgnsti t utigyijlism >
qased on n f tmr;; aJ.da;.1 ghts,
a tte r ned after the En lis h and Dut h
ac hievemen s , an popular in En g an and Ame r ica .
hi r d, there
was the concept of fk mocre;t y based...o..n n atlllral r j gl;jt,r;, w ich was
_9evelo ped in France by Rouss eau and Ln-Ame r i c a by Thomas Jeffer- son , a nd later by the Jackso n ians . Fmu t , the r e was the d.e
velo me nt
' lit r·
' sm which was an e thical me thod gf
and social
l ems - .her than a

(ilrs!)

(

Our s e l ec tions illu st r ate only two o f these tende ncies :
.gnligh:ten ed ~spot ism ,and dem o.c :x::~mr has ect a D na t.11,n~ a J ri~~ .
These rep r es e nted the main a venu es o f po l itical r eform chosen
by the e ighteent h century on t h e Co ntinent . The first selectio n , An Ess ay o n For ms of Gov e r nment, a n d on the Du ties of
SovereTgns ~ was-wr itten i n 1777 by ~derTci:t~Great. King of
_grussia. ( 1 7 40- 1786).
I t is a st atement o f the advantages of _
e n lighte ned des potism by a man who practi ce d the theor y in his
own cou n t r y .

(

We a r e astonished at imagini n g the human r ace so long
existing in a bru tal state y a nd withou t fo r ming itself
i n to soc i e ti es . Reasons a r e - accor ding ly s u gge sted, such
as mi g ht i n d c e p eopl e like these to u nit e in bodies . _]Jl
mu s t h a ve b een t he vio
ce and pill a ge whi c h exi
d,
among neighbo ur i ng hOrde s, that cou l
a ve fi r st inspi r ed
s uch s a v a g e fami lies with t~wish of unit ing, that they
might secure thei r , p oss e ssio n§J by mu t u al de fence . Hence
laws took b i r th, whi ch tau ght those societies to prefer
the gener al t o individu al g ood . Fr om that ti me, no person durs t seize on t he effe c ts of ano ther, be cause of the
dre a d o f chas t i sement . The life , the wife, and the wealth
of a neighbour were sacred; and, if the whole society were
attac k ed, it was the du
of t he whol e to a s s emble for its
d efe nce . The r and t rut h , -- " That we shou l d d o u nto
others a s t hey s otU ld o u nto u s" -- b e c a me the princ iple
o f laws, a n d o f the s o c ial compact . He nce o r iginated the
_to_
u r c ount r
hi e was r egarde
e a
0f
a

\
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allow of, and to elect, a superior; because this is the
true o r i g in of soverei g n power . The mag istrate, thus
appointed, was the first servant of the state. When
rising states had any thing to fear from their nei g hbours ,
the magistrate armed the people, and flew to the defence
of the citizens . . . .
We have remarked that men granted pre-eminence to
one of their equals, in expectation that he should do them
certain services . These services consisted in the maint~nc: ~;= ::~\J:~ a.ws...; a s ...trict execution of justice_; a~
e~pl~~
hole powers to revent an corru t1on
o--r-ulann.e¥s; and efend1ng
e s t ate a g ainst its enemies.
It is the duty of this ma g1stra e o pay attention o
agricultu re ; i t should be his care that p r ovisions for
the nation shou ld be in abundance, and that commerce and
indu st r y shou ld be encouraged . He is a perpetual sentinel , who mu st watch the acts and the conduct of the enemies of the stat e . His foresi g h t and prudence should
form timely all i ances, which should be made with those
who mi g ht most conduce to the interes t of the association.
By this short abstract, the variou s branches of knowledge, which each article in particular requires, will be
pe r ceived . To this must be added a profound study of the
local situation of the country, which it is the mag istrate ' s du ty to govern, and a perfect knowled ge of the
g enius of the nation; for the sove
·
sins through
igno r anc~ is as culpable as
e who sins t hrough malice:
e first is
e gu1
o 1 leness, the latter of a
vicious heart; but the evil that resul t s to society is
the same .
r
Pri nces and monarchs, therefore, are not invested
with s u re
a t
r it
hat the rna
unit
riot
in debaucherY- and volu tuous es
They are not raised by
t e1r e ow citizens in order that their pride may pompously display i t self, and ' contemptuously insult simplicity of manners, pover ty and wr etchedness. Government is
not int r usted t o them t hat they may be surrounded by a
crowd of useless peop le , whose idleness engenders every
vice .
The ill administration of monar chical g overnment
ori g inates in variou s cau ses, he sour ce of hich is in
the ch
f the soverei g n . Thus a prince addicted to
women s u ffers himself to be governed by his mistresses,
and his favourites, who abuse the ascendancy they have
over his mind, commit injustice , protect the most vicious,
sell places, and are guilty of other similar acts of infamy .
If the prince , through debility, should abandon
the helm of the state to mercenary hands, I mean to ministers, in that case, each having different views, no one
p r oceeds on general plans : the new minister fritters
away what he finds already established , however excellent
that may be, to acquire the character of novelty, and
execute his own schemes, generally to the detriment of
the pu blic good.
His successors do the like ; they destroy
and overtu rn with equal want of understanding , that they
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may be sup p osed t o p ossess o r i g inali t y . Hence that succession o f change and v a ri a t ion wh i ch allows no p r oject
t ime t o t ake r oo t ; hence confusi~n , diso r der, and every
vice o f a bad admin i st r a t ion.
Prevaricators have a ready
excu se ; they shelter their turp i tude u nde r these perpetual
chan ges .
Men attach t hemselves to that wh i ch appertains to them,
and t h e s t a t e does not appe r tain t o these min i sters , for
which r eason t hey have not its real good at h eart; business
is c a relessly execu ted, and with a kind of stoic indifference;
and hence r esu l t s the decay of justice, and the ill administration o f t he f inanc es and t he mi l itar y . From a monarchy,
it was t he ove r nment de ener ates into a true ar~stocr c ,
con
~ ~a,ccO--rdi...ng
w ~ch mi_n .s.t.er,.s......aa . g n _r
to their own f anci s . There is no longe r any com rehensive
~ ; each purs u e his own plans, an
e centra
int, the J1p/4
p oint o f uni t y, is lost . As all t e wheels o a wa c cQr- ~~~~
r espon d t o e ff ect t he s rrme purpose, wh ich is tha t of measuring
time , so oug h t t he spr ings of gov er nmen t to be re gu lated, that
all the d i f f e r ent branches of admin i st r ation may equally con-c ur to the g r e at est g ood of the s t a t e; an important object,
of which we ou g h t never to lose si g h t.
We may add , t he pe r sonal i n t eres t of ministers and
gene r als u s u ally occasions them to cou nteract each other
withou t ceasing , and sometimes to impe d e the execution of
the best plans, becau se they had not been conceived by
thems el v es . Bu t "t.he =evil is a t i.ts u tmo.s..t , when per_verse
mi nds a e
o e r s u ade
e so _
and the u h l ·
a
~
The monar ch then becomes the enemy
his people , withou t knowing why; is
sever e , r i g o r ou s , and inhuman ~ fr om mistake; for , the
principle on which he acts being false, the consequences
mu st necessari ly be the same .
The sov e r e i g n is attached by i ndissolu ble ties to the
body of the s t a t e ; hence it follows t hat he, by repercussion , is sensible o f a ll the ills which afflict his subjects ; a nd t he p eop le , in like manner, s u ffer from the
misfo rtu nes whi c h a ff ect their so ve r ei g n . There is but
one g ener al g ood , wh ich i s that of the sta t e . If the
monar ch lose h i s p r o v inces, he i s no longe r able as forme r ly t o assis t his subjects . If misfor t u ne have obliged
him to cont r act debts, they mu st be liqu idated by the
poor c i tizens ; and, in r eturn, i f t he people are not numerou s, and if t hey are opp r es s ed by pover ty, the sovereign
is dest i t u t e o f all r esou r c e . These a r e t ru ths so incontest a ble that t he r e is no need to insist on them further.
I once mor e r epeat, the sove r e jgn r ~p r2~ nts tre state;
he and hi s peop le form but one body, whi ch can only be
~
happy a s far as u n i ted by concor d . The p r ince is to the
nation he go v e r ns what the head is to the man; it is his
d u ty to see, think , and act fo r t he whole community, that
.he may p rocu r e it eve r y a dvantag e of which it is capable.
·
· . t ended that a monar chical shou ld excel
bse ~ ence ~s pronou nce
4
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He must be active, possess integrity, and collect his
whole power s, that he may be able to run the career he
has commenced . Here follow my ideas concerning his duties.
He oug ht to p r ocure exact and ci r cumstantial informa- ,
tion on t he str~ngth and weakness of his country, as well
relative to pecuniary resources as to population, finance,
trade, laws, and t he g enius of the nation whom he is appointed to g ove r n . If the laws are good they will be
clear in their definitions; otherwise, chicanery will seek
t o el u de their spirit to its advantag e, and a r bitrarily
and i r regularly determine the fortunes of individuals.
Lawsuits ought to be as short as possible, to prevent the
ruin of the appellants, who consu me in useless expences
what is justly and duly their right . This branch of government c a nnot be t oo car efully watched, that every possible barr ie r may be opposed to the avidity of judg es and
c ou n s ellor s . Eve r y person is kept within the limits of
t hei r duty, by occasional visits i nto the p r ovinces . Whoever imag ines himself to be inj u red will venture to make
his compl ai nts to the commission ; and t hose who are found
to be p r evaricators oug ht to be severely punished.
It is
perhaps superfl u ous to add that the p~nalty ought never to
exceed the crime; that violence nev eF" ought to supersede
l aw; and that it were better the soverei g n should be too
merciful than too severe . ~'-~ ' ~
As every pers
b does not proceed on principle is
incon~istent in his conduct, it is still more necessary
that the magistrate who watches over the public good
should act f r om a dete r minate system of politics, war,
finance , commerce, and law . Thus, for example, ~..P~opl ~
of mild rna
not to h
ch
s a r e ada te
~
Gh~~e~
The basis of such
sys ems ou ght always to be corr espondent to the greatest
good society can receive . Their p r inciples ought to be
conformable t o the situation of the country, to its
ancient c u stoms, if they a r e good, and to the genius of
the nation ., . .
The mili t a r y system ou ght, in like manner, to rest
on good principles, which from experience are known to be
ce rt ain . The geniu s of the nation ought to be understood;
of what it is capab le , and how far its safety may be
risked by leading it against the enemy . The warlike customs of the Greeks and Romans a r e interdicted, in these
a ges . The discove r y of gu npower has entirely changed the
mode of mak i n g war . A s u per iori ty of fire at p r esent
decides the day . Discipline, ru les , and tactics have all
been changed, in o r der that they may conform to this new
c u stom; and the recent and enor mous abuse of numerous
t r ains of a r tillery, which incumbe r a r mies, obliges others,
in like manner, to adopt this method; as well to maintain
themselves in their posts as to attack the foe in those
whi c h they shall occupy, should reasons of importance so
require .. . .
Bu t neither politics nor the army can prosper if the
finances are not kept in the greatest orde r~ and if the
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prince himself be not a prudent economist. Money i~ like
the wand of the necromancer, for by its aid miracles are
performed. Grand political views, the maintenance of the
military, and the best conceived plans for the ease of the
people, will all remain in a lethargic state, if not animated by money.
The economy of the sovereign is the more
useful to the public good, because if he have not sufficient funds in reserve, either to supply the expenses of
war, without loading his people with extraordinary taxes,
or to succour citizens in times of public calamity, all
these burthens will fall on the subjects, who will be without the resources, in such unhappy times, of which they
will then stand in the most need .
,s,
No government can exist without taxation, ...wh~w
e ually necessaxx to the r ~ ublic and to tne 'monarchy,
The sovere1gn who labours in the public cause mus
e
paid by the public; the judge the same, that he may have
no need to prevaricate . The soldier must be supported
that he may commit no violence, for want of having whereon
to subsist .
In like manner, it is necessary that those
persons who are employed in collecting the finances should
receive such salaries as may not lay them under any temptation to rob the public. These various expenses demand
very considerable sums, and to these must still be added
money that should only be laid apart to serve for extraordinary exigences . This money must all be necessarily
levied on the people; and the grand art consists in levying so as not to oppress . That taxes may be equally and
not arbitrarily laid on, surveys and re g ist ers shouta be
made, by which, if the people are properly classed, the
mone
·
·
e
income of the persons
yayi D8-'.
This is a thing so necessary that it woul
e an
unpardonable fault, in finance, if ill-imposed taxes should
disgust the husbandman with his labours . Having performed
his duties, it is afterward necessary he and his family
should live in a certain degree of ease.
Far from oppressing the nursing fathers of the state, they ought to be
encouraged in the cultivation of the lands; for in this
cultivation the true riches of a country consists ... .
In most of the kingdoms of Europe there are provinces
in which the peasants are attached to the glebe, or are
ser
to their lor s. This, of all conditions, is the
most unhappy, and that at which humanity most revolts. No
man cer
as born to be the slave of his equal.
e
reasonably detest such an abuse; an 1 i
~osed that
nothing more than will is wanting to abolish so barbarous
a custom . But this is not true; it is held on ancient
tenures, and contracts made between the landholders and
the colonists . Tillage is regulated according to the
service performed by the peasantry; and whoever should
suddenly desire to abolish this abominable administration
would entirely overthrow the mode of managing estates, and
must be obli g ed, in part, to indemnify the nobility for
the losses which their rents must suffer.
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The state of manufactures and of
n article no
less impor ant, next presents itself . For the country to
be preserved in prosperity, it is indubitably necessary
that the balance of trade should b
·
·
r.
If it
pay more for importation than it gains by exportation,
the result will be that it will be annually impoverished.
Let us suppose a purse in which there are a hundred ducats,
from which let us daily take one, and put none in, and
every body will allow that in a hundred days the purse
will be empty . The means to avoid incurring any such loss
are to work up all raw materials of which the country is
in possession, and to manufacture foreign raw· materials,
that the price of labour may be gained, in order to procure a forei g n market ... .
We shall now speak of another article, which perhaps is
equally interesting . There are few c_o untries in which the
people are all of one religious opinion; they often totally differ . There are some who are called sectaries. The
question then is started -- Is it requisite that the people should all think alike, or may each one be allowe.d to
think as he pleases? Gloomy politicians will tell u~
every body ou g ht to be of the same opinion, that there
may be no division among the citizens . The riest
· 1
add whoeve d e not think like me ·
amned, and it is
by no means_ gr..QPe
ha.t
y king should be the
in of the
_The inevitable desiucti on is they must be derna be the more prosper~:....f.JJ-~~~~...,...

(7:)_'1 ~ .

To this it is answered that all the members of one society never thought alike; that, among Christian nations,
the majority are Anthropomorphites; that, among the Catholics, most of the people are idolaters, for I shall never
be persuaded that a clown is capable of distinguishing
between Latria and Hyperdulia . He simply and really
adores the image he invokes . Therefore there are a number of heretics in all Christian sects . What is more,
each man believes that which appears to him to be truth.
A poor wretch may be constrained to pronounce a certain
form of prayer, although he inwardly refuse his consent.
His persecutor consequently has gained nothing.
But, if
we revert to the origin of all society, it will be found
evident that
er · n has no ri
interfere in
the belief o
· ct . Would it not be madness to
imagine men who have said to another man, their equal,
"We raise you to be our superio;r>, because we are in love
with slavery; and we bestow on you the power of directing
our thoughts, according to your will?" On the contrary,
they have said, "We have need of you for the maintenance
of those laws which we are willing to obey, and that we
may be wisely governed and defended; but we also require
that y ou should respect our freedom . " This is the sentence pronounced, and it is without appeal. Nay, ~~ance is itself so advantageo~, to the people
ong whom
it i s established, that it constitutes
e
. ines ~
the state . As soon as there is that perfect freedom of
<"*
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op1 n1 on , t he pe ople a r e a ll at peace ; whe r eas pe r secution
has gi v en bi rt h to t h e most bloody civil wars , and s u ch
as have be e n the most invete r ate and the most dest ru ctive.
The least evil that r esul t s from ~secu ti on is to occasion the pe r secu ted t o e migr ate . ~- ~ e popu lation of France
has suffere d i n ce r tain p r ovi nces , and those provinces
still a r e sensibl e t o the r evocation of the edict of Nantes)
Such are in gener al the du ties imposed u pon a prince, \
from which, in o r de r that he may never depart, he oug ht
of ten to recollect h e h imself is but a man, like the least
o f hi s subjects . If h e be the first general, the first
minis ter of t he realm, i t is no t that he should r emain the
shadow o f a u tho rity, but that he shou ld fulfill the duties
of s u ch ti tle s , He is only the fi r st ~ervant of the state,
who is o b li ged t o act wi t h probity a nd p r udence; and to
r emain as t o tally disinteres ted as if he were each mqment
l i a ble to r ender an acc ount o f h is administ r ati o ns to his
fellow citi z e ns ,
Thus h e is cu l pab l e, if h e be p r od iga l o f the money of
the p e op le , dispe r sing the produ c e o f the taxes in luxury,
pomp, o r licent i ou sness , It is fo r him t o watch o v e r
morals ~ whi c h a r e the gu ardians o f t he laws, and to improve the nati onal edu cati on, and not perve r t it by ill
examples . One o f the most important objects is the preservation of g ood mo r als, in all thei r purity; to which the
sovereign may greatly cont r ibute, by distinguishing and
rewar di n g those citizens who have performed virtuous actions, and testifying hi s c o ntemp t for s u c h a s are so dep r aved as n o t t o blus h at their own diso ~ de r s .
The prince
ou g h t highly t o disappr ov e o f eve ry dishonest act, and
refu se dis t incti ons t o men who a r e incorrigible.
The r e is an o ther interesting object which ought not to
b~ lost si g ht of, a nd Which, if negl ec ted, would be of irr epar able prej u dice to good -morality ; which is that
pri n ces a r e l iab l e too h ighly to notice per sons who are
possessed o f n o other mer it than that of grea t wealth.
Honours, s o u ndeser ve dly bestowed, confi r m the people in
the vu lgar p r ej dice t h at weal th, only, is necessary to
gain respect . Inte r est and c upidity wi ll then b r eak forth
from the c u r b by which they are restraine d . Each will
wish t o accu mula e r iches; a nd , t o acqu i r e these, ~he most
iniqu itou s means will be employed . Co r rupti on increases,
takes roo t, and becomes general . · Men o f abi lities and
vi r tue a r e despised, and the pu blic honour n one but the
bastards o f Mida s, who d azzle by thei r excessi ve dissipati on and t hei r pomp . To p r event national manners from
being perve rt ed t o an exc ess so horr ible, the princ e
ought ' t o be i ncessan tly attentive t o distinguish nothing
but per sonal me r it , and to show his c ontempt f o r tha t
opulence which is destitu te of morals and of vi rtue.
As the s o ver eign is p r operly the head of a family of
ci tizens, the fa t he r o f his pe ople , he ough t on all occasions to b e the last refuge of the unf o r t u nate; to be the
par ent o f the o r phan, a n d the husband o f t he widow; t o
have as much pity f o r t he lowes t wretch as f o r t'he greatest
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court ier ; and t o shed his benefactions over those who,
dep rived o f all o t her aid , can only find succour in his
benevolence .
Such , according to t he p rinciples which we established
at the beginni ng o f t his Essay, is the most a ccurate concep ti on we can for m of the dutie s of a sove r eign, and the
onl y manner which can r ender monarch ical government good
and advantage ous . Should the condu ct of many princes be
fou nd diffe r ent, i t mus t be at tribut ed to their having reflected bu t little on their insti t u ti on, and its de r ivato ry du ties . They have borne a burt hen with the weight
and importance o f which they · we re u nac quainted, and have
been mis led from the want of _knowledge; f or in our times
ignor ance commits more fau lts t h an vice " Su ch a sketch of
sover ei gnty will perhaps appear t o t he censorious the
archetype of the St oics ; and ideal sage, who never existed
except in i maginati o n, and to whom t he near est appr oach
was Mar cu s Aureliu s . We wish this feeb le Essay wer e capable of fo r ming men like Au r elius ; it would be the hi g hest
r eward we c ou ld possibly e x p e c t, at the same time that it
would condu ce t o t he good of · mankind .

(

*

(

The influence o f Je an Jacqu es ~ous se ~u ( 1712-1778) on the
men and ideas of the Enli ghtenmen t was du e not only to his accep tance and u se o f t y pical En light enment ideas, but also t o
his powe r f u l expression o f the feelings behind those ideas . He

enquire whether, taking
as t heY may be mad~ ,
- ·
·us t and Gertain r
e

*

r e e r 1c
reat , ' An Essay on Forms o Government, an on
the Dut ies o f Sove reigns," in Political, Philosophical and Satyrical Miscellanies ( London, 1789) , V, 7-16, 18, 20-25, 2~2 .
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of my re sear ch I shall endeavour to unite what right permits with what int e r est p r escr ibes, t hat justice and
utility may no t be separated.
I shall ent e r on my enqu iry wi thou t saying anything
abou t the impor tance of my subject .
I f I am asked whether
I am a p r ince o r a lawgi ver, that I wr ite on politics, I
shall answe r that I am neithe r , and for that reason I am
a political wr iter . I f I wer e a p rince or a lawg iver, I
should not was t e in theory the time which I ought to employ in p r ac t ice; I wou ld act or I would remain silent.
Born a citizen of a free Sta~ e , and, as such, a member
of it s Soverei g n , howeve r weak the influence of my voice
may p r ove in the determination of p u blic affairs, -t he
ri ght of voting on s u ch occasions imposes on me the duty
of informing mysel f on the subject : and I am happy, whenever I medi t ate on g ove r nmen t s, to find that my researches
always af f o r d me new r eason to admi r e that of my own country.
Chapter I
Subject of the Fi r st Book
~ 1.#~
M~n is p or n free , and y e t we see him everywhe~ ~ ~~
in cha i ns . Those who believe themselves the masters ~
;01 others cease not to be even g reater slaves than the
people t hey g overn. How this happens I am ignorant;
but if I am asked what r enders it justifiable, I believe
it may be in my power to r esolve the question .
If I we r e only to consider fo r ce, and the effects of
it, I should s ay_, "When a people is constra:i, Q..e.d, t~y,
and does obey, it does wel l ; but as soon as it can throw
o
its yoke, and does throw it off , it does better : for
_
a people may cer tainly use, for the recovery of their ~
' ~
liberty, t h e same right that was employed to deprive them ~~/
of it : it was ei t her justifiably r ecovered, or unjustifiably to r n f rom them." But tlJ.e social order is a sacred
righ t wh~
for the
·
al
Yet t~
right comes ot f r om natur e; it i~therefore f9 unded o ~
c ventions . The question is, what those conventions are.
But , be f o re I come to that point, I must establish the
p r inciples which I have just asser ted .

r.t;

Chapter I I I
Of the Right of the Strongest
The st r ong es t are still never suf ficiently strong to
ensure them continu al mastership, unless t h ey find means
of t r ansfo r ming force into ri g ht, and obedience into duty .
Hence the r i ~ ht of tbe st r ongest -- a ri ht which seems
ironica in a earance, but is ?ally establis e as a
p r inciple . But shal we never have an explanation of this
't erm'? Fo:rce is a physical power; I do not see what morality can result f r om its effects . To yield to force is an
act of necessity , not of inclinat ion; or it is at best
only an act o f prudence . In what sense then can it be a
duty?

\
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Let us s u ppose for a moment the existence of this p~e
tended r ight .
I see n_g thi pg that can ari se fr Ol!Li:t but ~ L L~~ a.
inexpl jcahl e nonse::l:l5 e . For , .!f we adrni t - that force conrT- sf1 tutes right , the effec t changes with the cause: _ ~
1orce wh1 c h ove co
j__rst succeeds to its :t,i
As soon as men can di sobey with impunity, they can do so
justifiably; and because the st r ongest is always in the
righ t, strength is t he only thing men should seek to acqu i r e , But what s o rt of right i s t h at which perishes
with the force that gave it existence? If it is necessary t o obey by f o rce, there can be no occasion to obey
from duty; and whe n f o r ce is n o more , al l obligation ceases
with it , We see, theref or e, that this wor d "right" adds
nothing to f o rce, but is indeed an unme ani n g term .
If in saying, "Let us obey t he powerful," they mean to
say, "Le t us yield t o for ce , " the precept is good, but it
is s u perflu ou s, f o r it never is o r can be violated . All
power , we a r e told, c omes fr om God , I grant it does; bu t
all dis eas e s likewise c ome from the same hand, and yet
who eve r forbade us t o cal l in a physician? If a robber
surprises me in a corne r of a wood , is it necessary that
I shou ld not only give him my pur se whe n forced to do so,
but am I in conscienc e obl ige d to give it t o him, though
I shou ld be i n a position to e scape?
For the fact is,
t he pistol whic h he holds i s also a power .
tH te

!!J t+Sa:a:£&; t~gg;~l~~~~

,Powe ~ .

~:a~nf~:aii~/t~s 1 :f ti~~j~~-

Thus everything goes back t o my first question .

.. . To
r enou nce our quality
of man, aru
o
No adequate c ompensati on can possibly be made for a sacrifi ce so comple t e . Such a renunciati on is incompatible
with t h e p ature of ma n; whose actions, when once he is
dep ri ve d of his fr ee wi ll, must be destitu te of all morality . Finally, a convention which stipu lates absolute
aut hority on one side, and unlimi t ed obedience on the
other, must be conside r ed a s vai n and cont r adictory .
Is
it not clear that t h ere can be no obl igation to a person
from whom everything may be justly r equire d? And does
not the single circ umstance of t her e being no equivalence
and no exchange als o annu l t he act ? For what r ight can
my slave have against me, si n c e ever ything that he has
belong s t o me, and, his right be i n g mine, this right of
mine against myself is absolute nonsense?
Gr o tius and o thers de riv e fr om war another origin for
this p r etended right o f s lave ry . The victor having, accor ding t o them , a r i ght t o kill the vanquished, the latter may purchase his life at the expense of his liberty;
a conve nti on which is so mu ch the mo re justifiable because it t e nds t o benef it both parties .
But it is clear that this pretended r ight of killing
the va~q~ ished re sults not in any ~an~er from the state
~
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of war ; becau se, while men r emain in their p r imitive independence, there is no intercourse between them s uf ficiently
settled t o cons titut e e ither peace or war; and they are
not n aturall y_enemies.
I t is a concurr ence of things, and
no t of men, t hat occasions war; and the state of
ca no t rise out o f s imple pers onal conc.er.nq, but only ou.tv of
real r e iitrons i l}Or
. can pr i y.at.~ between ' ma n anclmane xist ei t he r ~n t he state o f nat]1re, where there ~s
sett le d_prope rty L or i n a
·
a e, whe r e ever
r.
u nd
he au th ·
aw.s .
·P ri vate c ombats , due ls, and rencontres a r e acts w:Qicli
do not c onsti tute a state o f war ; and with regar d to the
petty wars a uthori zed by the "Establishmen ts" of Louis IX
of France, a nd suspended by t he ~eace of God, they were
abuses o f the feudal g over nment, a system so completely
absurd that it contradicted t h e princi ples o f natur al
ri ght and of every sound polity .
Uar is ther efo re not a c onc ern between man and man
but be t ween ~ te and St at e in Whi Ch individuals are o nLy
enemies ace
ly , not as men, or as citiz s, but as
·s...o ~e r s ,; o t as members of a cou. n tr , but as_ its de f enders.
In fine, State s can only have o · e r States, and not men,
for enemies, be c ause t he r e c an be no true r el ati on between
thi n gs of dif f erent nature s ... .
~
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~s insuffi ·
come
e r esis
es ~
, o h is £:ese rvati o» . Tis p rimit i ve state can therefore
.~
·
s u bsist no longe r ; and the hu man race would perish unless~
it changed its manner o f life .
h ~C- k;t]f-As men cannot create for thems elves new forces, but _/ _ 1::-, ~
mer ely unit e a n d dire ct tho se which a l r eady exist~e
-v~P~ J
only means t he¥ can empl oy f or thei r reservation is~ ~ 1form by aggr e ga ~on
em aae of f o r
~e
able t o ove rc ome
be put in motion as
one body, and t o act
Th is assemblage o f forces mus t be produ ced by the concurrence of many; but as the f orce a nd t he liber ty of each
man are the chi ef instruments o f his preservation, how can
he engage t h em elsewhe re withou t danger t o himself, and
without ne g lecting t he care which is due himself? This
difficulty, wh i ch leads di r ectly to my subject, may be exp r essed in t hese w o r ds ~
"jihe.J;e sha J 1 w'it;=f ind § :(grm
d al}d r o t ec t w~t h t h

The a r tic les of this c ontrac t ..a.;ce_ so u nalterably _f ixed
by the n ature o f the a c t t hat the least modification renders
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everywh~e, and are everywhere tac i t f y understood and
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adffi itte~ e v en thou g h they ma never have been formal!
announced; un 1 ,
e soc1al compac
e1ng v1olated, each
~nd 1 v i du al is res t ored to his ori g inal ri g hts, and resumes his nativ e liberty, while losing the conventional
l i berty for wh i ch he renounced it.
The a rti cles o f the social contract will, w
clearly
understood , be found reducible to t .his
oint:
1b.fL.
total aliena t ion o f ea ~ associ a ~... an
hi~ ri ht ,
to the whole . communi 't,Y~ , 4 fo
·n t .
· _ l....,P. lace 1 as every
iffiliViatia l g ives h i mseLf.. l:lp entirely, the condition qf
every person i s a · ~a ; and being a~ · ~~
~he i n~ erest of
ondition offensive
0 0 ners.
ay:-more than this, the alienat ion being made without
any reser v e, the union is as complete as it can be, and no
associate has any furt h er claim to anything:
for if any
individual ::r_etained ri g hts not .e.n.ioyed i n g en_eral by all,
"as ' there would be no common superior t o decide between him
and the public, each person being i n some points his own
judg e, would soon pretend to be so in everything ; and
t hus would t h e
t
cont_i nued and th.e a sociation necessarily become tyrannical or be anni ·
ad.
1nally , each ~erson 1v
· ·
, and so not
t o any one ind1v 1 ua ; an as there is no one associate
over whom the same right is not acqu i red wh i ch is · ceded
1
to him by others, each gains an equivalent for what he
loses, and finds his force increased for preserving that
which he possesses.
I f , there f ore, we exclude from t h e social compact all
that is no t essential, we shall find it reduced to the
·~G~ - ~
followin g terms :
"/ , / r-Each of us places in common his person and all his ~ 1~~ ~~
power--unGertne sup remeairect 1 on--oi the g eneralWI1I;and ~~~~
as one body we all receive each member as an 1ndiVISTble ~~ ~
part of--=tlie Wlio~
-C?te-~--...,
- - From that moment, instead of as many separate persons ~~
as the r e are contrac t in g parties, this act of association -- :zZ, ~
p roduces a moral and collective body, composed of as man~~~
members as there are votes in the assembly, which from
~~--/ ·
this act rece i ves its unity , its common self, its life,
and its will.
This public person, whi ch is thus formed
by the union of all other persons, took f ormerly the name
of "c i ty," and now takes that of "republic" or "body politic."
It is called by its members "State" when it is
passive, "Soverei g n" when in activity, and, whenever it
is compared with other bodies of a similar kind, it is
denominated "power." The associates t ake collectively
t he name of "peop le," and separately, that of "citizens,"
as participa t ing in t he soverei g n authority, and of "subjects," because t hey are subjected to the laws of the
S t ate.
But these terms are frequently confounded and
used one for the other; and it is enoug h that a man understands how to dis t inguish them when they are employed in
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all their precision .

(

(

-Chapter VI I
Of the Sovereign
It appears frO:ffi this formula that the act of association contains a reciprocal en a ement between the
~n
.1
·
ua ~ an
a each individual, contracting, as
it were, with himself, is engaged under a double character; that is, as a member of the Soverei n en a in
ith
individuals, an as a member of th .
t te
d with the
Sovereign . But we canno apply here the maxim of civil
right, that no person is bound by any engagement which he
makes with himself; for there is a material difference
between an obligation to oneself individually , and an obligation to a collective body of which oneself constitutes
a part.
It is necessary to observe here that public deliberation, which can bind all the subjects to the Sovereign, in
consequence of the double character under which the members of that body appear, cannot, for the opposite reason,
bind the Sovereign to itself; and consequently that it is
against the nature of the body politic for the sovereign
power to impose on itself any law which it cannot break.
Being able to consider itself as acting under one character only, it is in the situation of an individual forming~ contract with himself; and we see therefore that
there neither is nor ·c an be any kind of fundamental law
obligatory for the body of the people, not even the social contract itself . But this does not mean that this
body could not very well engage itself to others in any
manner which would not dero gate from the contract; for,
with respect to what is external to it, it becomes a
simple being, an individual. But the body politic, or
the Sovereign, which derives its existence from the sacredness of the contract, can never bing itsel! even
towards outsider~, i ~at would dero~ate : from
li
rf inal act, ~c
alienating any ortion f 'tsel_f, or submitting to another Soy ere1gn. To violate the
contract by which it exists would be to annihilate itself;
and that which is nothing can produce nothing .
As soon as this multitude is united in one body, you
cannot offend one of its members without attacking the
body; much less can you offend the body without incurring
the resentment of all the members. Thus duty and interest equally oblige the two contracting parties to lend
aid to each other; and the same men must endeavour to
unite under this double character all the advantages
which attend it .
Further, the Sovereign, being formed only
dividuals who compose i ~ , ~ther has, _ n~o
~
r~
c~~~~
interest contrary to th~:i,~; consequent ly, the sovereig;n
power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it
is impossible that the body should seek to injure all its
members; and we shall see presently that it can do no
injury to any individ~ al in particular. The Sovereign,
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s alwa s ever thin it ou ht to_jQe.
But this is not so with the relation of subjects
towards the Sovereign, which, notwithstanding the common
interest, has nothing to make them responsible for the
performance of their eng agements if some means is not
found of ensurin g their fidelity.
In fact, each indiv i dual may, as a man, have a private will, dissimilar or contrary to the general will
which he has as a citizen . His own private interest may
dictate to him very differently from the common interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence
may make him re g ard what he owes to the common cause as
a gratuitous contribution, the omission of which would be
less injurious to others than the payment would be burdensome to himself; and considering the moral person
which constitutes the State as a creature of the imagination, because it is not a man, he may wish to enjoy the
r ights of a c itizen without being disposed to fulfil the
d u ties of a subject.
Such an injustice wou ld in its
progress cau se the ruin of the body politic .
In orde r , therefore, to prevent the social compact
from becoming an empty formula, it tacitly comprehends
the engagement, which alone can give effect to the others
-- that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be
compelled to it by the whole body :
this in fact only
forces him to be free; for this is the condition which,
by givin g each citizen to his country, guarantees his
absolute personal independence, a condition which gives
motion and effect to the political machine , This alone
renders all civil engagements justifiable, and without it
they would be absurd, tyrannical, and s u bject to the most
enormous abu ses.

~
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Chapter VIII
... O.f- -t he.. Gi v-i .l - t-a.t
from the state of nature
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being and a man ,
In o r der to draw a balance between the advantages
and disadvantag es at t ending his new situ ation, let u s
state them in s u ch a manner that t hey may be easily compared.
~s by the social cont r act his natur al libe rt y, and
an unlimited right to all which tempts
and which~
can obtain; in r eturn h e ac u ires civ·~ liberty, and pr~
prietorshi p o . a 1 he possesses.
T a t we may not be de""Ceived in the value of these compensations, we must disti n gu ish na tural liber ty, _w h j ch-k.GG-w.s · no b m mds 'But -tile
power of
·
· '
f r om c · ·
· te.tlY-,
· ch is
limited
he o- _,_e,r:a l wil~; and between J20Ssession,
w 1c is only the effec t of force o r of the rigb1 of the _
first occupan t~ ~m pxnpert~ which must
n_a
.ROSitive title .
In addition we mi g ht add to the other ·
acqu isitions o f the cfvil state that of mo ra l liberty,
which alone rende r s a man master of himself; fo r it is
slave r
t o be u nde r the impu lse of me r e appe t ite ~
r ee o m o o . e y a
aw wh1c we prescr1 e
o r o urs elves ,
Bu t I h ave already sai d t oo much on this h ead , and t h e
philos ophical sense of the word "liberty" is not at present my s u bjec t ,

hlw,
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Chapter IX
Of Real Property
. , , I shall conclude this chapte r
whi c h mus t se r v e for the basis of t h::.e
;:_~=-=:..:..-;;.,=--.::;;.:;.,...,;;;..t..,:;;...:..:;.;;,;
it is hat
instead of de
the

be eve r so u nequal i n st r ength o r in genius,
equalized by c onv en t ion and le g al right ,
Book II
Chapt e r I
That S ove reig n t ~:;l:!;: n !PJ e
The fi rs=t'""and ti't§= · ~ conse quence of the principles already es tab l ishe d is t hat t he g ener al will alone
can di re ct t he f o r ces o f the Sta t e a greeably t o the end of
its institu ti on, which is t he c ommo n g ood ; fo r if the
cl a shing o f p r i v ate i nte r e sts has r ender ed the establishing of societies necessar y, t he a greement of the same int e r es t s has made such establishments p ossible .
It is what
i s common in t h e ee diffe r en t interes t s that forms the
social bond; a nd if there was not some point in which they
all u nanimou sly c entered, no society could exist .
It is
on the basis of this common i nte r es t alone that society
must be g o ver ned ,
I say, therefo r e , t ha t sovereigntr, being only the exe r cise o f the g ener al will' c a~ ne ver ali ~nat_e i tsel;f' J!lld,
that the Sove rei~ ~~ ~~ ~¥ a collecti y e he jpg , caq
n a t b e reEresent~ ifsRii ~
the power may well be
ft a mfi L~ d but __Q_t._~ i __ .
Indeed, if it is not imposs i ble that a private will

X

p. 59

should accord on some point with the general will, it is
at least impossible that such agreement shou ld be regular
and lasting; for the private will is inclined b it
nature to partiality, an
e g eneral will to impartiality.
rt is even more impossible to guarantee the cont i nuanc e~ of
this agreement, even if we were to see it always exist;
because that existence must be ow.in g not to art but to
chance . The Sovereign may indeed say ~ "My will at present actually agrees with the will of s u ch and such a man,
or at least with what he declares to be his will''; but it
cannot say, "Our wills shall likewise agree tomorrow";
since it · would be absurd for the wi ll to bind itself for
the future, and since it does not belong to any will to
consent to what migh t be injurious to the being from whom
the will proceeds .
If, therefore, the people promise unconditionally to obey, the act of making s u ch a promise
dissolves their existence, and they lose their quality of
a people; fo r a..t the moment that the r e is a master. thepe
< i~ ~~;! ::::;.:ot=::~;i gn, and frOJ)l · t ha :t_ momen t . the body

~

1

I do not say that the commands of chiefs cannot pass
for gene r al wills, so long as the Sover eign, being f r ee
to oppose . them, does not do so . In such cases we mu~t
presume from their silence that the people yield their
consent . But I shall explain this more at large presently.

(

Chapter II
That Sovereignty is Indivisible
For t he same reason that sovereignty is inalienable_,
it is~divisible .
For the
enera or it
J.. is ei t fier the will of t
w "' _e bo
- oi th

at most £ut a dec k@~.
But our political thinkers not being abl
sovere1gnt in r1nc1 e
ave div1 e 1t in its ob·ect :
in ""'o force and will; le g islat1ve power and execut1 ve power;
the r ights of levying taxes, of administer ing justice,
and making war ; the internal government and t he power of
treating with foreigners . But by sometimes confounding
all these parts, and sometimes separating them, they make
of the sovereign power a fantastical being composed of
related pieces; as if man were composed of several bodies,
one with eyes, another with arms, anothe r with feet, but
none with anything more . The mountebanks of Japan are
said to dismember an infant in the sight of the spectators,
throw its limbs one after another into the air, and make
the child come down alive and whole. The tricks of our
political jugglers are very similar, for after dismembering the social body by a sleight wor thy of the black
art, they bring its parts together again, nobody knows
how .
This error a r ises from our not having formed exact ideas
of the sovereign authority, and from our taking for parts
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of that authority what are only its emanations.
For example, the acts of declaring war and making peace are
considered as acts of sovereignty, when in fact they are
not so, because neither of these acts is a law, but only
the application of the law, a particular act which determines the application of the law, as we shall clearly
perceive when the idea at.tached to the word "law" is fixed.
By tracing in the ~arne manner the other divisions, we
should find that whenever we suppose sovereign.±y divjded
we deceive oursel ~es; that the rights which we take for a
part of~fiat sovereignty are all subordinate to it, and
always suppose supreme wills of which they only sanction
the execution .
It is impossible to express how greatly this want of
exactness has obscured the arguments and conclusions of
writers on political right, when they have attempted to
decide on the respective rights of kings and peoples by
the principles which they have themselves laid down.
Every person may see in the third and fourth chapters of
the First Book of Grotius, how that learned man and his
translator, Barbeyrac, have entangled and embarrassed
themselves in their sophisms, fearful of saying too much,
or of not saying enough to a.tl&wer- their designs, and ap- prehensive of clashing with those inter~ which they
had to conciliate .
Grotius, discontented with his own country, took
refuge in France; and endeavouring to make his court to
Louis XIII, to whom his book is dedicated, he has spared no
pains to despoil the people of all their rights and transfer them to their kings in the most artful manner. This
was also the design of Barbeyrac, who dedicated his translation to George I, King of England . But unfortunately
the expulsion of James II, which he calls "abdication,"
obliged him to proceed very cautiously, to shuffle and
evade, that he mi ght avoid making King William appear a
usurper.
If these two writers had adopted the true principles, all their difficulties would have been removed,
and they would have been always consistent; but the task
of speaking truth, and recommending themselves to no
favour but that of the people, would have been to them a
vexatious one. Truth does not lead to fortune, and the
people have neither ambassadorships, professorships, nor
pensions to bestow.
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There is frequently much difference between the will of
all and the general wil!_. The l~tter regards only the
-~mmon
Sl; the for er regards private interest, and
1s indeed but as · of private wi s ~ but remove
om
these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each
other, and then the general will r emains as the sum of
the differences.
If, when the people, s u fficiently informed, deliberated,
there was to be no communication among them, f r om the
grand total of t r iflin g differences the general will would
always result, and their resolutions be always good . But
when cabals and partial associations are formed at the expense of the g r eat association, the will of each such
association, though general with r egard to its members,
is private with regard to the State ~
it can then be said
no longer that there a r e as many voter s as men, but only
as many as there are associations . By this means the differe'nces be i n g less nume r ou s, the y produ ce a resu lt less
general . Finally, when one of these associations becomes
so lar ge that it p r evails over all the r est, you have no
longer the sum of many opinions dissenting in a small degree f r om each other , but one great dictating dissentient;
from that moment there is no longer a general will, and
the p r edominating opinion is only an individual one.
~refore of the utmost importance for obtaining
the expression of the general will, that
r~ socf.:
~e~ y srru
r
- e State, and that every citizen
s ould speak his opinion entirely from himself ~
such was
the u niqu e and s u blime ~ystem of the great Lycurgus .
When there are partial societies, it is politic to multiply their number, that they may be all kept on an equality.
This method was pursued by Solon, Numa, and Servius .
These are the only precautions that can be taken to make
the gener al will always intelligent, and prevent the people
from being deceived .

*

*

Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, ed . Charles
Frankel ( The Hafner Library-of Classics ) (New York ~ Hafner Publishing CO:: 1947 ) , pp . 5-6,-g~g, 10-ll, 14-19, 22-27 . Used
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0

ered i n
g eneral
side r ed a s a
Upon the Social Nature o f Man
For as we have many membe r s in one body , and all membe r snave no t t1leSame o f fice: s o weoeingmany are
o ne body in ChrTSt --;-aiid ever y o ne membe r s one of anothe r , -- Rom . xii. ~5 .
, ,, I t c anno t indeed possibl y be den i ed , t h a t our being
God's c r eatures , and vi r t u e being t he natural law we a r e
bor n u nde r, and the whole constitu tion of man being
plainly adapted t o it, a r e p r ior obli gat ions to pi e ty and
v i rtue, t h an t h e conside r ation t h a t God s e n t h i s Son into
the wor ld t o s ave i t, and t he motives whic h ar ise f r om
t h e pecu l iar r elat ion of Chr istia ns, as members one of
anothe r u nde r Chr ist our head.
Howeve r , t hou g h all this
be allowed, as it exp r essly is by the inspi r ed wri ters ;
yet it is manifest that Chr istians a t the t i me of the
r evelation , and immediately after , cou ld no t but insist
mostly u pon consider ations of this latte r kind ,
These obse r vations show the o r i g inal par ticu lar reference of t he t ext ; and the peculiar fo r c e with which the
thing i n t ended by the all u sion in it, must have been felt
by the p rimiti ve Christian world. They like wise afford a
r eason fo r treating it at this time in a more general way .
The r elati on which the seve r al par ts o r members of the
natural body have t o each othe r and to the whole body, is
here compar ed t o the r elation which each par ticu lar person
in society has to the othe r par ticu l ar pe r sons and to the
whole soc i e t y; a nd t he latte r is intended to be ill u st r ated
by the fo r me r , And if there be a li k eness between t hese
two r elations , the consequence i s obv iou s : tha t t he lat ter
shows u s we we r e inte ed to
.
~he r s, a s t he
fo r mer shows u s that the ·se ve r al member s of t he natural
body wer e int ended t o be inst ruments of good to e a ch other
and t o the whole body . But as t he r e is scar ce any gr ou nd
fo r a compar ison between society and t he me r e material
body , th i s withou t the mind being a de a d inact i ve thing ;
mu ch less can t he compar ison be carr ied to any length . And
since the apostle speaks of the sever al me mbe r s as having
distinct of f ices, which implies t he mind ; it canno t be
though t an u nallowable liberty , ins te ad of the body and its
membe r s , t o s u bs t itute the whole n a ture of man,-anG all toe
var 1ety of i nte r nal principles which belong to it , Ana--then tlie-comp a r 1son will be between the na ture 0I ma n as
~~ ecting self
__ d t~din to ri vate gp d his ow~ r es~r_vatlon ~~~..an~e . .u e of ma
s havi
~p ec t to socje t y, and tending to p r omo t e pu blic g oo~
j.lle happ iness o f t ha :t saci e:ty_..,... These ends do indeed
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perfec tly coincide; and to aim at p u blic a~ d private good
are so far fr om being i nconsistent , tha t they mutually
p r omote each other ; yet in the followin g d i scourse t hey
must be consider ed as entirely distinc t; otherwise the
nature of man as tending to one, o r as te ndin g to the
other, cannot be compared . There can no comparison be
made, withe t considering the things compar ed as distinct
and diffe re nt .
From this r eview and comparison of the nature of man
as r especting self, and as re specting society, it will
plainly appear, t hat there are as real and the same kind
of indications i~uman nature ,that we we re madeio_r__
society and to do g ood to our feTIOW creatUres; as~at
we were Tlltenctedlto take-car e of our own life andlhealth
and----.r>rivate g ood :-and that the-same ObJeetTOnSlie a g ainst
one of these-aBSe rtTOns~ agai~ th e o ther.
For ,
- - -pir , , There is a natUr al p ri nc ip le of benevolence in
man; which iS i n some degree t o s OCieLy--;- what self-love __ _
And :1-rt"ii'er e be i n mank:1n an:y:1s to" the individual .
tii spos ition t o frien dsh ip; if t here be any s u ch t hing as
compassion, fo r compassion is momentar y love; if there be
any such t h ing as the paternal o r filial affecti o ns ; if
there be any affection in human nature, t he obj ect and
end of which is the good of another; this is i tself benevolence, o r the love of another . Be it ever so shor t, be
it in ever so low a degree, or eve r so u nhappily confined;
it p r oves the assertion, and points out what we wer e desi gned fo r , as r eally as though it were in a higher degree
and mor e extensive ,
I must however remind you that though
bene v olence and self-love are different; t hough the former ·
tends most d ire ctly to public good, and the latter to private ~
yet they a r e so perfectly coincident, that the
greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having
bene v olence in a due de gree; and that self-love is one
chief secu r ity o f our right behaviour towar ds soci et y .
It
may be added, that their mutual coinciding, so that we can
scar ce promote one without the other, is equally a p r oof
that we were made for both .
Secondly, This will further appear , from observing that
the several pa~Ql~nd~d affections,
hich ar disti~ct
both r om
- ~e-and self-love do i
_ ne ~ al ~OArJ.bute and lead us to ublic ood as really as to private.
It ~ight be thoug ht too minute and par i cular, an · Wou
carry u s too great a leng th, to distingu ish between and
compare together the several passions o r appetites distinct
from benevolence, whose primary use and intention is the
security and good of society; and the passions dis ti nct
from self-love, whose primary intent i on and design is the
securit y and good of the individual . It is enough to the
present argument, that desi r e of esteem from other s, contempt and esteem of them, love of society as distinct from
affection to the good of it, indi g nat ion against successful vice, that thes~ are public af f ections o r passions;
have an immediate respect to othe r s, naturally lead u s to
regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of

X

service to our fellow creatures.
If any o r all of these
may be considered likewise as p r ivate affections, as tending to p r ivate good; this does not hinder them from being
public affections too, or destroy the g ood influence of
them upon society, and their tendency to public g ood.
It
may be added, that as persons without any conviction from
reason of the desirableness of life, wou ld yet of course
p reserve it merely f r om the appetite of hung er; so by acting merely from re g ard (suppose ) to repu tation, without
any consideration of the good of othe r s, men often contribute to public g ood .
In both these instances they are
plainly instru ments in the hands o f ano t her, in the hands
of Providence, to carr y on ends, t he p r eser v ation of the
individual and g ood of society, wh i ch they themselves
have not in their v iew or intention .
The sum is, men
ha
s
assions , and par t1cu lar a e ti
both from se
a
rom benevall of the se have a tendency o r omo e b~
ub-=-=~~~~<~.-.~-~.::...:~-t::t."£2_ , ~nd__mi£.:_~~-£9nS1 ~d- as~.l?J~s ting
~~~:::_:::.:...-::==-..;:::
o:.:::
u~r;..:;s:::.;e=...v,.,.......,~
eg_.ual].,y; an _ in ~_g¢fumon :
but some of
them _§_£,.Sill! most ~.mm~ tely to r_esp~&Ji g"the r s, tQl r
ena to
public g ood ; others of them most immediately to r espec t
self, o r tend to p rivate good :
as the forme r - are n o ~
' bene volence, so the latter are not self-love :
neither
sort .,.a..J:.e i l!§,.,.i. .ces of our lo
ei..ther-~~s.abt. es
ot h e S.::; u L g.!!l., ins lrul..c e.s qj_ gux:. Mak~ r' s care and love both
of the · d:LY.i.dua± n d.. the S.P,e <j.. es J_ an. p_.x:.o..Q f:~~ - a
e 1ntended . ~ ~~ ld ~E§~um~ntp _p { . ~ood to e ch
t~~-' as
·well as that ~we _ srHo:uld .he so to oursel
.
-·· Thirdly, · ---N""··.
rinci le . ;£ reflectio
~
which they dis tin ui
a ~ r ove and disa r ove
1r own ac !j-~s.
We are pla1n y cons 1~t u'tedsuc1r sort
U f c r eatu res as to reflect upon our own natu re.
The mind
can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, ave r sions, passions, affections, as respecting such
objects , and in such degrees; and of the several actions
consequent the r eupon .
In this sur vey it app r oves of one ,
disapproves of another, and towar ds a third is affected in
neither of these ways, but
quite indifferent . This
b
di a
roves hi
io
for this is t he
word, thou g h some t imes it is used so
as to take in mo r e . And that th i s facu lty tends to rest r ain men f r om doing mischief to each other, and leads
them to do g ood , is too manifest to need being insisted
upon .
Thus a parent has the affection of love to his
childr en :
t his leads him to take care of , to educate, to
make due prov i sion for them; the nat u r al affection leads
to t his :
b ut the reflection that it i s his p r oper business , what belong s t o him, that it is righ t and commendable so to do; this added to the affec ti on becomes a much
more set t led pr inciple, and carri es him on throu gh more
labour and difficulties for the sake of his children,
than he wou ld under g o from that affection alone, if he
t hought it , and the course of action it led to, either
l
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indifferent or criminal. This indeed is impossible, to
do that which is g ood and not to approve of it; for which
reason they are frequently not considered as distinct,
thou gh they really are:
for men often approve of the actions of others, which they will not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve not.
It cannot possibly
be denied, that there is this principle of reflection or
conscience in human nature.
Suppose a man to relieve an
innocent person in g reat distress ; suppose the same man
afterwards, in the fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given no just cause of offence;
to aggravate the injury, add the circumstances of former
friendship, and obligation from the injured person; let
the man who is supposed to have done these two different
actions, coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without
regard to their consequences to himself : to assert that
any common man would be affected in the same way towards
these different actions, that he would make no distinction between them, but approve or disapprove them equally,
is too glaring a falsity to need being confuted. There
is therefore this principle of reflection or conscience
in mankind.
It is needless to compare the respect it has
to private good, with the respect it has to public; since
it plainly tends as much to the latter as to the former,
and is commonly thought to tend chiefly to the latter.
This faculty is now mentioned merely as another part in
the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in some deg ree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally
and of course have some influence. The particular place
assi g ned to it by nature, what authority it has, and how
g reat influence it ought have, shall be hereafter considered.
From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of
our public and private affections, of the courses of life
they lead to, and of the principle of reflection or cons 'ence as respecting each of them, it is as manifest,
)
at we were made for society, and to promote the haEPiss o f it ; as that we were intended to take care of our
n li f e, an~health, and private good.
~
And f rom th1s wh o l e rev1ew must be g iven a different
drau g ht of human nature from what we are often presented
with . Mankind are by nature so closely united, there is
such a correspondence between the inward sensations of
one man and those of another, that dis g race is as much
avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem
and love as much desired as any external goods:
and in
many particular cases, persons are carried on to do good
to others, as the end their affection tends to and rests
in; and manifest that they find real satisfaction and
enjoyment in this course of behaviour . There is such a <
natural principle of attraction in man towards man, that
having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in
the same climate, barely having been in the same artificial district or division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and familiarities many years after:
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for any thing may serve the pur pose .
Thus rel ations merely
nominal are soug ht and invented, not by governors, but by
the lowest of the people; which are found s u fficient to
hold mankind tog ether in little fraternities and copartnerships ~
weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough
for ridicule, if t hey are absurdly considered as the real
principles of that union :
but they are in truth merely the
occasions, as any thing may be of any thing, upon which
our natur e carries us on according to its own previous
bent and bias; which occasions therefore would be nothing
at all, were . there not this prior disposition and bias of
nature.
Men a r e so much one body, that in a pecu liar manner they feel for each other, shame, sudden danger, reT
sentment, honour, prosperity, distre s s; one o r another, or
all of these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon t he occasion of natural r elation, acquaintance, p r otection, dependence; each of these being distinct
cements of socie ty.
And therefore to have no re st rai nt
from, no r egard to others in our behaviour, is the speculative a bsurdity of considering ourselves as single and
independent, as having nothing in o ur na ture which has
respect to our fellow creatures, reduced to action and
practice .
And this is the same absurdity, as to suppose
a hand, or any part, to have no natur al respect to any
other, or to the wh ole body.
But allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man
dispositions and principles within, which lead him to do
evil to other s, as well as to do g ood? Whence come the
many miseries else, which men are the author s and instruments of to each other?" These questions, so far as they
relate to the fore g oing discourse, may be answered by asking, Has not man also dispositions and p r inciples within,
which lead him to do evil to himself as well as g ood?
Whence come the many miseries else, sickness, pain, and
death, whi c h men are instruments and a ut hors of to themselves?
It may be thought more easy to answe r one of these
questions than the other, but the answe r to both is
really the same; that~m
~
a~
n~k~i~n~d
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~which th
wi
at
but thai as there is no s u ch thing as se
so neither is there any such thing as ill-will in
one man towards another, emulation and r esentment bein g
away; whereas there is plainly benevolence or good-will:
there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression,
t r eachery, ing ratitude; but only eag er desires after such
and such external g oods; which, accordin g to a very ancient observation, the most abandoned wou ld choose to
obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy, and as
effectual to their end :
that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will consider what these passions
really are in nature, will be found nothing to the purpose of this objection :
and that the principles and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from
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self-love and benevolence , p r imar ily and most di r e ct ly
lead t o r i ght behavi our with regard to o thers as well as
himself , and onl y secondar ily and accidentally to what is
evil . Thus, though men, to av oid t he shame of one villany, a re somet imes gui l ty of a greater, yet it is easy
to see, t ha t the origi nal tendency of shame is to prevent
the doing of shamefu l actions ; and its leading men to
conceal s uch actions when done, is only in c onsequ ence of
thei r being done; i . e . of the passions ' s not having answe re d its fi.rst end-:If it be said, that t he r e a r e pe r sons in the world,
who are in gre at measu re without the natur al affections
t owards their fell ow c r eat ur es ~
there are likewise instances of p ers ons without the common natural affections
to thems e lves ~
but t he n atur e of man is not to be judged
of by eithe r o f these , but by what appears in the common
world , in the bulk o f mankind . ...
The sum of the whol e is pl ai nly t his . The nature of
~c onsid ered i n his singl e capacity, a nd with respect
OOl y t o the present wor ld , is_ a dap t ed
.
· ~ to
attain the
i
the
wor l d , The nature g f man, considered in his publ~i~c~o~r~s~o
~
c~
i~aT
~ c apa ci t y, leads him t o a ri ght behaviour
in so ciety to t hat cours e
v1
.e
o ow or obey thei r nature in both these capacities
and r espects t o a certain de gm.e_, but note t i ~ l · ~
their
actions do n ot come u p to the whole of what t heir nature
leads them t o i n either o f these capacities o r r espects ~
and they of ten v ·
. e · natur e i n both, i . e . as they
negle ct the duti es they owe to
e1 r fe liow creatures, to
which thei r nature l eads them ; a n d are i nj uri ou s, to
which thei r nature is abhorrent; so ther e is a manifest
ne g l igence i n men of t he i r re al happiness or interest in
t he present wor l d, when that in terest is inconsistent with
a p r esent grati f i cat i o n; fo r the sake of whi c h t hey negligently, nay , even knowing ly, are t h e aut hor s and instruments of t hei r own mis ery a nd r uin . Thu s they are as
often u nj u st to themse lves as t o other s , and for the most
p art a re equ ally so t o both by the same acti ons . *

67

